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Introduction	Our	best	social	scientific	theories	try	to	tell	us	something	about	the	social	world.	But	is	talk	of	a	“social	world”	a	metaphor	that	we	ought	not	take	too	seriously?	In	particular,	do	the	denizens	of	the	social	world—cultural	values	like	the	Protestant	work	ethic,	firms	like	ExxonMobil,	norms	like	standards	of	dress	and	behavior,	institutions	like	the	legal	system,	teams	like	FC	Barcelona,	conventions	like	marriages—exist?	The	question	is	not	merely	academic.		Social	scientists	use	these	different	social	entities	to	explain	social	phenomena	such	as	the	rise	of	capitalism,	the	decline	in	oil	prices,	or	the	effect	of	unions	on	the	sports	labor	market.		But	how	could	these	explanations	possibly	work	if	social	entities	don’t	exist?		 Questions	about	the	existence	of	social	entities	have	implications	for	both	philosophical	and	social-scientific	inquiry.	A	central	area	of	philosophy	is	ontology—the	study	of	what	exists.	Social	ontology	is	a	relatively	new	field,	and	enriches	older	ontological	debates	with	novel	questions	and	broader	concerns.	But	the	realism	debate	is	not	exclusively	(or	even	primarily)	about	ontology;	rather,	there	is	an	intimate	link	between	these	ontological	questions	and	epistemological	concerns	about	how	social-scientific	explanations	should	proceed.	For	instance,	whether	social	entities	exist	determines	the	extent	to	which	these	explanations	should	emulate	their	natural-scientific	counterparts.	Similar	considerations	determine	the	extent	to	which	these	explanations	must	appeal	to	individual	actions.			 To	navigate	this	intellectual	landscape,	let’s	introduce	a	distinction.	A	realist	is	anyone	who	believes	that	social	scientists	are	warranted	in	believing	that	social	entities	exist;	an	antirealist	is	anybody	who	disagrees.	Different	antirealists	disagree	with	realists	for	different	reasons.	Consequently,	we	canvass	five	kinds	of	antirealism	below:	explanatory	pessimism,	fictionalism,	eliminativism,	reductionism,	and	constructivism.		 Debates	about	realism	in	the	social	sciences	tend	to	cluster	into	one	of	three	categories.	First,	should	we	be	realists	about	the	theoretical	entities	appealed	to	in	our	best	social-scientific	theories?	These	debates	parallel	their	counterparts	in	the	philosophy	of	natural	science.	Realists	in	the	natural	sciences	argue	that	the	predictive,	experimental,	and	technological	success	of	natural-scientific	explanations	warrants	belief	in	entities	such	as	quarks	and	gravity.	Similarly,	our	most	empirically	successful	explanations	of	poverty,	for	example,	invoke	social	strata,	social	structures,	and	economic	policies.	If	such	entities	are	necessary	features	of	our	best	explanations,	does	that	entail	that	we	should	be	realists	about	such	entities?		Realists	argue	that	the	best	way	to	account	for	the	explanatory	success	of	our	social	scientific	theories	is	by	being	realists	about	the	entities	posited	in	our	theories;	anti-realists	deny	this	claim.			 Second	are	questions	about	whether	we	should	be	realists	about	groups,	where	we	can	understand	groups	roughly	as	a	collection	of	individuals	organized	with	some	collective	interest,	goal,	or	characteristic.	Groups	can	range	from	micro-groups	consisting	of	a	few	individuals,	to	meso-groups	such	as	corporations,	all	the	way	up	to	macro-groups	such	as	nations.	Realists	about	groups	believe	that	groups	cannot	be	reduced	to	mere	collections	of	individuals;	antirealists	about	groups	think	
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that	groups	can	be	explained	without	remainder	in	terms	of	the	individuals	who	constitute	the	group.		 Third	are	questions	about	whether	we	should	be	realists	about	the	things	
that	groups	create.	Entities	such	as	money,	laws,	race,	and	gender	are	“socially	constructed,”	in	the	sense	that	their	most	important	properties	depend	on	how	we	conceive	of	them.	By	contrast,	natural	properties—the	charge	of	electrons,	the	height	of	mountains,	and	the	atomic	weight	of	chemical	elements,	for	instance—are	independent	of	how	we	conceive	of	them.	We	might	wonder,	then,	whether	the	fact	that	groups	create	social	entities	means	that	they	are	not	real.		Realists	about	socially	constructed	entities	(such	as	money	or	race)	argue	that	these	entities	could	not	function	in	our	lives	and	in	the	world	without	being	real;	antirealists	about	socially	constructed	entities	argue	the	contrary.	In	what	follows,	we	look	at	these	three	realist	debates,	canvassing	arguments	both	for	and	against	realist	and	antirealist	positions.		
1. Should	we	believe	what	social	science	tells	us?	Social	scientists	are	scientists.	As	such,	they	advance	theories	with	the	aim	of	predicting,	explaining,	and	controlling	some	part	of	the	world.	Let	us	say	that	theories	that	fulfill	these	aims	are	empirically	successful.	A	theory’s	empirical	success	is	the	most	compelling	reason	to	believe	that	it	is	(mostly)	true.	If	these	slogans	about	science	are	correct,	then,	to	the	extent	that	a	social-scientific	theory	succeeds	in	predicting,	explaining,	and	controlling	some	part	of	the	social	world,	we	should	be	realists	about	the	social	entities	that	it	posits.	In	what	follows,	we	develop	this	line	of	thought	by	discussing	the	central	argument	used	to	vindicate	the	reality	of	scientific	entities.	We	then	rehearse	two	prominent	objections	to	that	argument.			
1.1. The	Explanatory	Argument	A	powerful	argument	for	realism	is	that	the	staggering	level	of	empirical	success	of	modern	science	would	be	nothing	short	of	a	miracle	if	its	theories	were	radically	false.	For	this	reason,	many	philosophers	and	scientists	are	realists	about	subatomic	particles,	curved	space-time,	cells,	species,	natural	selection,	continental	plates,	and	so	on.	The	central	idea	is	that	realism	provides	the	best	(if	not	the	only)	explanation	of	the	relevant	aspects	of	the	domain.	Indeed,	realists	about	many	other	entities	(mathematical	objects,	moral	truths,	etc.)	invoke	this	same	principle	to	defend	their	positions.	This	suggests	the	following	“Explanatory	Argument”	for	realism	about	social	entities:	EA1.		 If	the	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	social	entities,	then	we	should	believe	that	social	entities	exist.	EA2.	 The	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	social	entities.	EA3.	 Therefore,	we	should	believe	that	social	entities	exist.		A	few	clarifications	are	in	order.	First,	the	conclusion	(EA3)	amounts	to	realism	about	social	entities.	Second,	an	explanation	posits	an	entity	just	in	case	that	entity	exists	if	the	explanation	is	true.	The	relevant	facts	are	typically	those	that	most	parties	to	a	debate	agree	are	in	need	of	explanation.	A	hypothesis	is	the	best	
explanation	of	a	fact	if	it	optimizes	the	set	of	criteria	typically	associated	with	our	
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best	theories:	simplicity,	scope,	fit	with	background	knowledge,	predictive	power,	and	so	on.		Indeed,	with	a	little	bit	of	reconstruction,	we	can	see	that	social	scientists	frequently	argue	in	this	manner.	This	is	particularly	clear	when	we	examine	the	extensive	work	on	both	qualitative	(King,	Keohane,	and	Verba	1994)	and	quantitative	(Blalock	1971)	causal	inference	in	the	social	sciences.	For	instance,	suppose	that	the	chief	cause	of	poverty	is	a	federal	policy	that	permits	a	very	low	minimum	wage.	Then	that	policy	is	the	best	explanation	of	poverty.	Furthermore,	this	explanation	assumes	that	policies	have	causal	efficacy.	However,	non-existent	things	can’t	have	causal	efficacy.	Consequently,	policies	exist.	What	of	non-causal	explanations?	Consider	sociologists’	observation	that	men	born	in	lower	socioeconomic	strata	have	a	higher	chance	of	upward	social	mobility	than	those	born	in	higher	socioeconomic	strata	(Blau	and	Duncan	1967).	Why	is	this?	To	appreciate	the	answer,	consider	Al,	who	is	born	at	a	lower	socioeconomic	stratum	than	Bob.		If	a	socioeconomic	stratum	is	higher	than	Bob’s	current	stratum	it	is	also	higher	than	Al’s,	but	not	vice	versa.	Hence,	there	are	more	ways	that	Al	can	make	an	upward	move.	This	explanation	appears	non-causal,	as	it	only	invokes	probabilities	that	fall	out	of	the	“structure”	of	socioeconomic	strata	in	the	United	States	(Garfinkel	1981).	Zooming	back	out	to	the	larger	philosophical	picture,	the	best	explanation	of	the	observed	correlations	between	social	origins	and	social	mobility	posits	social	strata	and	social	structures.	According	to	the	Explanatory	Argument,	this	means	that	we	should	believe	that	social	strata	and	social	structures	exist.		
1.2. Explanatory	Pessimism	While	the	Explanatory	Argument	nicely	captures	a	prominent	way	in	which	philosophers	and	scientists	(both	social	and	natural)	justify	realism	about	theoretical	posits,	it	has	faced	several	objections.	In	particular,	philosophers	have	questioned	its	first	premise,	i.e.	that	our	best	explanations	are	an	effective	guide	to	what	exists.	For	ease	of	reference,	we	call	anyone	who	raises	this	challenge	an	
explanatory	pessimist.	Explanatorily	pessimistic	social	scientists	are	somewhat	rare,	though	they	typically	are	motivated	by	empiricist	concerns	that	we	only	can	know	correlations,	but	cannot	have	causal	knowledge.	Comte	(1868)	and	Mill	(1904)	are	early	examples	of	this	critical	stance	towards	social	explanation.	Other	authors	criticize	the	reliability	of	certain	kinds	of	explanations,	e.g.	functional	explanations	(Elster	2007),	and	hence	might	be	interpreted	as	expressing	qualified	forms	of	explanatory	pessimism.		 By	contrast,	several	natural	scientists	(and	the	philosophers	who	have	studied	their	work)	have	argued	that	our	best	explanations	are	not	a	trustworthy	guide	to	reality.	For	instance,	Newtonian	mechanics	was	the	best	explanation	of	many	phenomena	for	nearly	three	centuries.	However,	the	advent	of	Einsteinian	and	quantum	mechanics	in	the	early	20th	century	revealed	that	Newton’s	account	was	mistaken.	Consequently,	it	would	appear	that	the	Explanatory	Argument	has	given	us	bad	advice:	we	should	not	have	believed	that	Newtonian	space,	time,	gravity,	and	energy	exist.	
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Similar	examples	can	be	found	in	the	social	sciences.	Consider	Oscar	Lewis’	(1975)	once-prominent	explanation	of	poverty.	Looking	at	five	Mexican	families	with	different	socioeconomic	outcomes,	Lewis	reasoned	that	the	poorer	families	have	a	different	value	system	(a	“culture	of	poverty”)	than	their	more	affluent	counterparts,	and	that	this	value	system	prevents	them	from	taking	the	measures	needed	to	improve	their	socioeconomic	status.	As	the	explanation	gained	further	corroboration,	it	had	a	good	deal	of	prominence	by	the	end	of	the	1970s,	and	figured	prominently	in	policy	decisions	about	social	assistance.	Hence,	it	was	taken	by	many	to	be	the	best	explanation	of	poverty.	As	such,	the	Explanatory	Argument	counsels	us	to	believe	in	the	existence	of	a	culture	of	poverty.		Yet,	throughout	the	1980s,	as	finer-grained	empirical	measures	of	culture	developed,	and	a	wider	variety	of	impoverished	populations	were	studied,	it	became	clear	that	the	cultural	variation	among	the	poor	was	too	great	for	this	explanation	to	be	true.	As	before,	it	would	appear	that	the	Explanatory	Argument	has	given	us	bad	advice:	we	should	not	have	believed	in	the	culture	of	poverty.	Nor	is	this	example	an	outlier;	many	explanations	in	the	social	sciences	enjoy	some	notoriety,	only	to	face	searching	empirical	difficulties	at	a	later	date.	Antirealists	use	examples	such	as	this	to	critique	the	Explanatory	Argument.	On	one	version,	the	so-called	“Pessimistic	Induction”	(Laudan	1981),	the	best	explanation	at	any	given	time	is	frequently	rejected	at	a	subsequent	point	in	history.	Consequently,	we	should	not	believe	that	our	best	explanations	posit	real	entities,	since	they	are	likely	to	be	replaced	in	the	future.	Hence,	on	this	view,	“best	explanation”	means	“best	for	its	time.”	On	this	formulation,	Lewis’	explanation	was	the	best,	posited	a	social	entity	(the	culture	of	poverty),	but	we	should	not	believe	that	this	social	entity	exists.	This	falsifies	the	first	premise	of	the	Explanatory	Argument.	Alternatively,	and	closely	related,	some	antirealists	argue	that	our	explanation	may	only	be	the	best	of	a	bad	lot,	in	which	case,	we	should	not	believe	that	it	posits	real	entities	(Stanford	2006;	van	Fraassen	1989).	This	view	can	simply	be	a	variant	of	the	Pessimistic	Induction.	Alternatively,	it	may	motivate	skepticism	about	our	ability	to	identify	the	best	explanation,	even	if	such	an	explanation	justifies	realism.	On	this	view,	the	best	explanation	of	poverty	may	posit	a	culture	of	poverty,	but	we	cannot	know	that	this	explanation	is	better	than	the	rest.			 There	are	reasons	to	think	that	these	objections	to	the	Explanatory	Argument	are	especially	thorny	in	the	philosophy	of	social	science.	For	instance,	many	realists	have	responded	to	these	pessimist	challenges	by	claiming	that	our	best	explanations	only	entail	belief	in	posits	that	are	indispensable	to	novel	predictions	(Psillos	1999;	Worrall	1989)	or	experimental	interventions	(Hacking	1983).	Since	these	demanding	kinds	of	empirical	success	are	far	less	common	in	the	social	sciences	than	in	the	natural	sciences,	explanatory	pessimism	in	the	social	sciences	may	be	even	more	persuasive	than	its	natural-scientific	cousin.	Having	said	this,	some	have	suggested	that	social-scientific	hypotheses	also	contain	these	high-grade	posits	(Kincaid	2008),	and	so	realism	about	social	entities	is	on	par	with	realism	about	natural-scientific	entities.	
	
1.3. Fictionalism	
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Frequently,	non-philosophers	find	these	debates	about	realism	to	be	“pointless”	or	“merely	academic.”	On	such	a	view,	it	simply	does	not	matter	if	social	entities	exist	or	not.	There	are	more	and	less	principled	ways	to	make	this	point.	A	fairly	sophisticated	one	comes	from	fictionalists.	Like	explanatory	pessimists,	fictionalists	object	to	the	first	premise	of	the	Explanatory	Argument.	However,	whereas	explanatory	pessimists	are	largely	concerned	with	showing	why	we	cannot	know	much	on	the	basis	of	our	best	explanations,	fictionalists	emphasize	that	we	can	still	
use	our	best	explanations	in	the	absence	of	this	knowledge.	Fictionalists	can	thereby	articulate	the	principles	behind	the	complaint	that	the	realism	debate	is	“pointless:”	it	does	not	matter	if	realism	is	true,	for	it	is	enough	to	treat	social	entities	as	useful	fictions.	More	precisely,	even	if	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities,	we	can	still	use	those	explanations	without	believing	that	posited	social	entities	exist.	Typical	“uses”	include	explanation,	prediction,	control,	and	model	construction.	For	instance,	based	on	Blau	and	Duncan’s	work,	subsequent	scholars	have	found	it	useful	to	explain	social	mobility	in	terms	of	social	strata	and	social	structures.	However,	fictionalists	point	out	that	all	of	this	is	compatible	with	agnosticism	about	these	social	entities.	While	many	social	scientists	express	fictionalist	commitments	(e.g.,	Friedman	1953;	MacDonald	2003),	only	a	few	philosophers	are	fictionalists	about	social	entities	(Demeter	(2013)	and	Turner	(2003)	present	fictionalist	accounts	of	psychological	states	and	social	entities,	respectively.)	However,	the	resources	for	a	more	thoroughgoing	fictionalism	are	easy	to	find.	Van	Fraassen’s	(1980)	constructive	empiricism	is	a	fictionalism	that	appears	to	apply	to	all	science,	though	its	chief	applications	have	been	in	the	natural	sciences.	Van	Fraassen	is	a	fictionalist	about	unobservable	entities	in	science:	he	holds	that	we	can	use	or	accept	posits	about	unobservable	entities	without	believing	that	those	entities	exist.	In	other	words,	we	can	treat	posits	about	unobservables	as	useful	fictions	(e.g.	for	the	purposes	of	prediction	and	explanation.)	This	can	be	applied	to	the	social	sciences,	for	the	unobservable-observable	distinction	cuts	across	the	natural	and	social	domains.	For	instance,	subatomic	particles,	beliefs,	and	social	norms	all	appear	to	resist	any	direct	observation.	However,	fictionalists	of	this	sort	then	inherit	all	of	the	challenges	to	van	Fraassen’s	view.	For	instance,	some	have	wondered	whether	a	distinction	between	observable	and	unobservable	entities	is	sustainable	(Churchland	1985;	Hacking	1985).	Arguably,	this	distinction	is	even	more	vexed	in	the	social	sciences	(Block	1976).		To	summarize,	we	have	seen	that	realists	deploy	the	Explanatory	Argument	to	justify	their	position.	Such	a	view	holds	that	we	should	be	realists	about	entities	posited	by	our	best	explanations.	Antirealist	criticisms	come	in	two	broad	varieties.	First,	explanatory	pessimists	question	the	extent	to	which	we	can	trust	our	best	explanations	as	a	guide	to	what	is	real.	Second,	fictionalists	argue	that	it	is	enough	to	use	the	posits	of	our	best	explanations,	even	if	we	do	not	think	that	they	are	real.	Before	proceeding,	a	word	of	caution	is	in	order.	The	Explanatory	Argument	presupposes	that	the	social	sciences	ought	to	emulate	the	natural	sciences.	Specifically,	it	presupposes	that	realism	about	social	entities	is	justified	(and	perhaps	only	justified)	by	social-scientific	theories’	success	in	predicting,	explaining,	
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and	controlling	the	empirically	testable	parts	of	the	social	world.	Indeed,	even	the	critics	of	the	Explanatory	Argument	assume	this	much	of	the	time.		 However,	there	is	a	longstanding	debate	as	to	whether	the	social	sciences	have	different	aims	than	the	natural	sciences.	On	this	view,	successful	social	theories	need	not	be	highly	explanatory	or	predictive,	but	should	instead	furnish	fruitful	interpretations	and	give	us	a	richer	understanding	of	the	people	studied.	This	has	led	some	philosophers	to	argue	that	because	different	sciences	have	fundamentally	different	methodologies,	the	entities	in	those	sciences’	respective	domains	are	real	or	exist	in	different	ways	(Dupré	1993;	Root	2000;	Sundstrom	2002).	On	such	a	view,	our	beliefs	in	social	entities’	existence	are	subject	to	different	standards	than	our	beliefs	in	the	existence	of	natural-scientific	objects.	By	contrast,	others	argue	that	precisely	because	interpretation	and	understanding	are	more	inquirer-relative	than	the	explanation,	prediction,	and	control	characteristic	of	the	natural	sciences,	realism	about	social	entities	is	more	difficult	to	defend	than	its	natural-scientific	counterpart	(Reed	2008).		
2. Are	Social	Groups	Real?	Both	explanatory	pessimists	and	fictionalists	criticize	the	first	premise	of	the	Explanatory	Argument	(EA1),	which	states	that	if	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities,	then	we	should	be	realists	about	those	entities.	However,	many	philosophers	and	social	scientists	have	also	challenged	the	second	premise	of	this	argument	(EA2),	which	states	that	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities.	For	instance,	we	might	wonder	whether	our	best	explanations	of	poverty	really	posit	policies,	social	strata,	or	a	culture	of	poverty,	or	if	instead	they	only	posit	the	individuals	who	are	described	by	these	social	terms.		 This	concern	shows	up	most	clearly	in	discussions	about	the	reality	of	social	groups.	Some	find	the	idea	of	social	groups	standing	over	and	above	the	individuals	that	constitute	them	to	be	spooky,	and	also	find	the	methods	of	studying	these	groups	to	be	unscientific.	While	these	sorts	of	concerns	are	at	least	as	old	as	Mill	(1904)	and	Weber	(1978),	there	is	also	a	long	tradition	of	defending	the	integrity	of	social	groups	and	the	distinctive	methodology	of	the	social	sciences,	e.g.	Durkheim	(2013).	Contemporary	heirs	to	Mill	and	Weber	argue	that	“macro-level”	social	explanations	must	be	grounded	in	“micro-foundations”	that	appeal	only	to	individuals	(Elster	2007;	Hedström	2005);	others	demur	(Colander	1996).			 To	that	end,	let’s	assess	the	following	“Group	Variant”	of	the	Explanatory	Argument:	GV1.		 If	the	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	social	groups,	then	we	should	believe	that	social	groups	exist.	GV2.	 The	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	social	groups.	GV3.	 Therefore,	we	should	believe	that	social	groups	exist.		As	an	example,	consider	why	democracies	tend	not	to	fight	wars	with	each	other.	Suppose	that	two	democracies	are	in	a	dispute.	Because	losing	a	war	has	dire	electoral	consequences,	both	can	anticipate	that	going	to	war	will	lead	each	to	allocate	large	amounts	of	resources	to	a	risky	situation.	Because	of	this,	engaging	in	war	is	an	unattractive	option,	as	neither	democracy	is	assured	an	easy	victory	(de	Mesquita	et	al.	1999).	As	should	be	clear,	this	explanation	posits	social	groups	
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(democracies	or	electorates).	So,	according	to	this	argument,	we	should	infer	that	these	groups	exist.	We	will	call	those	who	subscribe	to	this	argument	group	realists.	Those	opposed	to	group	realism	have	two	potential	strategies.	First,	they	can	challenge	GV1,	in	which	case	they	pursue	the	explanatory	pessimist	and	fictionalist	strategies	above.	Alternatively,	they	can	challenge	GV2.	To	that	end,	it’s	useful	to	first	consider	the	arguments	in	favor	of	GV2.	(We	address	objections	to	GV2	below.)	First,	group	realists	emphasize	that	talk	of	groups	is	pervasive	in	our	ordinary	discourse:	we	predicate	things	of	groups	(“Americans	are	materialistic”);	we	attribute	mental	states	to	groups	(“The	Cato	Institute	believes	in	free	markets	and	individual	liberty”);	and	we	conceive	of	groups	as	unitary	agents	capable	of	acting	in	the	world	(“ExxonMobil	intends	to	grow	its	worldwide	crude	and	natural	gas	production	by	7.5%”).		Group	membership	figures	in	racial,	ethnic,	or	religious	group	affiliation,	and	thereby	plays	a	prominent	role	in	our	sense	of	identity.		And	groups	need	not	be	large,	or	institutional;	some	theorists	argue	that	groups	as	small	as	two	people	are	the	fundamental	elements	of	social	reality	(Gilbert	1989).	Moreover,	the	social	sciences	follow	ordinary	language	in	their	use	of	groups	as	explanatory	concepts.		Sociologists	appeal	to	group-based	concepts	such	as	social	institutions,	organizations,	states,	societies,	and	cultures,	while	economists	appeal	to	such	things	as	firms	and	networks.		As	should	be	clear	from	our	discussion	of	democratic	peace,	social	scientists	use	groups	to	explain	(individual	and	collective)	behavior.		Some	social	scientists	also	use	groups	to	account	for	the	nature	of	social	reality	(Berger	and	Luckmann	1991).		On	a	cursory	examination	of	social	scientific	practice,	it	would	appear	that	GV2	is	clearly	true.	However,	while	nearly	everyone	agrees	that	social	scientists	appear	to	make	use	of	groups	in	their	theories,	some	argue	that	this	appearance	is	misleading.	Certain	critics	of	group	realism,	whom	we	will	call	eliminativists,	hold	that	our	talk	to	social	groups	is	false	when	taken	literally	(Quinton	1975)1.	Other	critics	of	realism,	whom	we	will	call	reductionists,	hold	that	the	use	of	social	groups	in	our	theorizing	is	dispensable:	talk	of	social	groups	can	always	be	translated	into	talk	of	the	individuals	that	constitute	the	group.		If	either	of	these	positions	is	correct,	then	our	best	explanations	do	not	require	us	to	posit	social	entities,	and	so	GV2	would	be	false.	In	what	follows,	we	examine	these	two	alternatives	to	group	realism.		
2.1. Eliminativism	Eliminativists	think	that	there	are	no	such	things	as	groups;	rather,	there	are	only	individuals	interacting	with	other	individuals.		This	claim	was	memorably	stated	by	British	Prime	Minister	Margaret	Thatcher	(1987),	who	said:		…and	so	they	are	casting	their	problems	on	society	and	who	is	society?	There	is	no	such	thing!	There	are	individual	men	and	women	and	there	are	families.		(Of	course,	for	Thatcher	to	be	a	proper	eliminativist,	she	would	also	have	to	say	that	there	are	no	families.)																																																											1	While	we	are	referring	to	eliminativism	about	social	entities,	“eliminativism”	frequently	refers	to	an	analogous	position	about	individual	mental	states	(beliefs,	desires,	etc.)	in	the	philosophy	of	psychology.	
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While	eliminativists	hold	that	claims	invoking	group	concepts	are	false,	eliminativists	also	maintain	that	true	statements	about	individuals	can	replace	these	falsehoods.	Thus,	the	claim	that	Americans	are	materialistic	would	be	replaced	by	a	claim	to	the	effect	that	most	of	the	individuals	who	are	American	citizens	are	materialistic.	On	the	face	of	it,	eliminativism	is	counterintuitive.	After	all,	eliminativists	would	have	to	hold	that	a	claim	of	the	form	“FC	Barcelona	won	the	Champions	League	in	2015”	is,	strictly	speaking,	false;	to	be	true,	the	claim	should	be	reinterpreted	so	that	it	has	the	form	“Xavi	and	Iniesta	and	Messi	and	Neymar	and	etc.	won	the	Champions	League.”		But	regardless	of	what	we	want	to	say	about	that	second	claim,	it	seems	wrong	to	say	that	FC	Barcelona	did	not	win	the	Champions	League,	on	the	grounds	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	FC	Barcelona.	Why,	then,	is	eliminativism	a	plausible	view?		Some	think	that	methodological	individualism	entails	eliminativism,	and	so	they	find	eliminativism	plausible	because	they	find	methodological	individualism	plausible	(Tuomela	1990).	That	argument,	however,	appears	unsound.	Methodological	individualism	requires	that	claims	about	collective	entities	be	grounded	in	claims	about	the	actions	and	properties	of	individuals,	but	that	is	consistent	with	collective	entities’	existence.		So,	one	can	be	a	methodological	individualist	without	also	being	an	eliminativist.	(For	more	on	methodological	individualism,	read	the	chapter	on	methodological	individualism	in	this	volume.)	Eliminativists	must	hold	a	stronger	view.		First,	eliminativists	must	hold	that	
only	those	things	that	factor	into	our	best	explanations	determine	what	exists;	and	second,	that	none	of	our	best	explanations	appeal	to	groups.	These	claims	are	strong,	because	social	groups	are	featured	in	legitimate	explanations	all	the	time.	Consider	the	following	explanation	of	why	more	committed	sports	fans	are	likelier	to	be	violent	after	their	team’s	loss	than	less	committed	fans:	whereas	wins	by	a	sports	team	enhance	the	social	identity	and	self-esteem	of	all	fans,	losses	only	decrease	the	psychological	well-being	of	those	fans	who	most	strongly	identify	with	the	team.	Strongly	identified	fans	then	act	aggressively	in	order	to	regain	that	well-being	(Wann	et	al.	2001).	If	we	paraphrase	away	the	football	club	to	be	instead	about	the	individual	members,	the	explanation	no	longer	identifies	the	main	causes	of	spectator	aggression.		After	all,	membership	of	a	team	can	change	without	a	change	in	fan	identification,	and	some	people	can	strongly	identify	with	a	team	without	knowing	all	of	its	individual	members.		Eliminativist	arguments	might	work	for	establishing	that	particular	kinds	of	social	groups	are	not	real.	Consider	groups	such	as	“unwed	mothers	between	the	ages	of	18	and	30”	and	“individuals	who	self-identify	as	Jewish.”	These	are	examples	of	groups	such	that	possessing	some	set	of	properties	is	necessary	and	sufficient	for	membership	in	the	group.	While	these	groups	sometimes	seem	to	contribute	to	social	scientific	explanations,	the	eliminativist	would	argue	that	the	group	functions	in	an	explanation	only	insofar	as	the	membership	in	the	group	highlights	the	causal	factors	that	actually	play	an	explanatory	role.		Because	each	of	the	individuals	who	make	up	the	group	possesses	the	properties	that	define	the	group,	it	will	be	those	properties	that	are	doing	the	explanatory	work;	the	group	is	doing	no	work	at	all.			
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2.2. Reductionism	A	third	position,	reductionism,	falls	in	between	eliminativism	and	group	realism.	A	quick	note	about	the	term	“reductionism:”	in	certain	discussions,	reductionism	is	synonymous	with	eliminativism.	The	reason	for	this	conflation	is	understandable,	as	reductionists	agree	with	eliminativists	that	our	best	explanations	do	not	posit	social	groups,	i.e.	they	also	deny	GV2.	Specifically,	any	of	our	best	explanations	that	purport	to	posit	social	groups	are	really	just	shorthand	for	individualistic	explanations.	Moreover,	individualistic	factors	are	doing	the	real	work	in	these	explanations.	However,	like	group	realists,	reductionists	hold	that	social	groups	exist.	So,	following	the	philosophical	mainstream,	we	will	distinguish	reductionism	from	eliminativism.		 Two	crucial	claims	justify	reductionists’	claim	that	social	groups	exist.	First,	reductionists	assume	that	individuals	exist.	Second,	and	more	controversially,	they	argue	that	social	groups	are	nothing	over	and	above	the	individuals	that	comprise	them.	From	these	two	claims,	it	follows	trivially	that	social	groups	exist.	The	triviality	of	this	inference	means	that	social	groups	don’t	exist	in	any	“robust”	or	“substantive”	sense.	Thus,	social	groups	are	dispensable	or	redundant	given	information	about	the	individuals	who	comprise	them.	For	this	reason,	reductionists	are	sometimes	called	“redundant	realists”	(List	and	Pettit	2011).			 However,	reductionists	differ	from	group	realists	in	the	explanatory	roles	they	accord	to	social	groups.	Reductionists	hold	that	individuals	are	ontologically	fundamental	while	also	allowing	that	statements	about	groups	need	not	be	strictly	speaking	false.		Since	reductionists	hold	that	groups	are	not	essential	to	our	explanatory	aims,	and	since	all	statements	about	groups	can	be	translated	to	statements	about	individuals	but	not	vice	versa,	reductionists	deny	that	the	best	explanation	of	social	phenomena	requires	us	to	posit	social	entities—we	can	make	do	with	individual	entities	instead.		Like	eliminativism,	reductionism	faces	several	challenges.	For	one	thing,	reductionists	must	account	for	the	functional	structure	of	social	institutions.		Social	institutions	are	multiply	realized	in	the	behavior	of	individuals,	meaning	the	institution	itself	can	act	in	the	same	way	even	when	the	behavior	of	the	constituent	individuals	is	different.	Consider	the	explanation	of	democratic	peace	from	above.	When	we	try	to	understand	how	the	electorate	influences	the	decisions	of	democratic	leaders,	a	description	of	individual	votes	doesn’t	matter;	what	matters	is	a	description	of	the	voting	of	the	electorate	as	a	whole.	If	this	is	so,	then	explanatory	claims	which	appeal	to	the	social	institution	at	the	group	level	will	work	differently	than	explanatory	claims	which	appeal	to	the	social	institution	at	the	individual	level:	group-level	claims	explain	in	virtue	of	the	structural	relationship	between	the	members,	while	individual-level	claims	explain	in	virtue	of	the	properties	of	the	individuals	themselves	(Kincaid	1986).		Finally,	reductionism	fails	to	explain	how	social	groups	can	act	as	unitary	agents,	i.e.	how	firms,	institutions,	and	the	like	intend	to	do	things,	perform	actions,	and	hold	action-relevant	beliefs	and	desires.		Indeed,	List	and	Pettit	(2011)	argue	that	group	agents	necessarily	possess	action-relevant	mental	states	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	individual	mental	states.	Similarly,	Gilbert	(1989)	argues	that	group	
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mental	states	have	a	distinctive	normative	component	that	cannot	be	generated	by	individually	held	mental	states.	 		
3. Can	Things	be	Real	and	“Constructed”?	Many	social	scientists	(and	some	philosophers)	describe	themselves	as	“social	constructivists”	(e.g.,	Berger	and	Luckmann	1991).	However,	there	is	significant	disagreement	as	to	what	this	doctrine	entails,	whether	it	is	defensible,	and	if	it	is	incompatible	with	realism.	For	instance,	many	social	scientists	equivocate	between	
reality	itself	depending	on	social	conditions,	interests,	and	the	like,	and	the	more	modest	claim	that	our	representations	of	reality	exhibit	this	social	dependence.	Any	careful	formulation	of	the	former	is	very	difficult	to	defend.	By	contrast,	the	latter	is	compatible	with	there	being	a	world	with	a	structure	that	is	independent	of	these	representations,	i.e.	it	is	compatible	with	realism	(Boghossian	2006).	More	qualified	forms	of	constructivism	claim	that	social	scientists,	as	the	foremost	experts	on	society,	play	a	special	role	in	constructing	social	entities.	For	instance,	MacKenzie,	Muniesa,	and	Siu	(2007)	claim	that	economists	make	(i.e.	construct)	the	markets	that	they	study.	For	our	purposes,	we	will	treat	constructivists	as	a	distinct	kind	of	antirealist.	To	get	a	sense	of	the	debate	between	realists	and	constructivists,	consider	three	statements:	
Vertebrate:	Chris	and	Pat	are	vertebrates.	
Marriage:	Chris	and	Pat	are	married.	
Cute:	Chris	and	Pat	are	cute.	Intuitively,	Vertebrate	is	true	in	some	“objective”	sense,	and	Cute	is	only	true	in	some	“subjective”	sense.	In	principle,	moderate	realists	and	moderate	constructivists	can	agree	on	these	points.	The	disagreement	concerns	claims	such	as	
Marriage.	Are	these	contested	claims	more	“objective”	like	Vertebrate	or	more	“subjective”	like	Cute?	To	make	any	progress,	we	need	to	get	clearer	on	what	“objectivity”	and	“subjectivity”	mean	in	these	contexts.	To	do	this,	we	first	examine	the	constructivist’s	claim	that	social	entities	“depend”	on	us,	and	then	turn	to	the	kind	of	objectivity	at	stake	in	the	realist-constructivist	debates.		
3.1. Kinds	of	dependence	Regardless	of	any	further	differences,	all	social	constructivists	hold	that	a	constructed	entity	“depends”	on	something	social	in	some	way	for	its	existence.	More	precisely,	constructivist	claims	always	involves	two	entities.	The	first	is	what	we	will	call	the	dependent	entity.	We	will	focus	on	cases	in	which	the	dependent	entity	is	a	social	entity.	In	our	example,	Chris	and	Pat’s	marriage	is	the	dependent	entity.	The	second	is	the	constructing	entity,	i.e.	the	entity	on	which	the	dependent	entity	depends.	Necessarily,	constructing	entities	have	to	be	social	or	psychological	entities.	Presumably,	the	constructing	entities	in	our	example	are	the	marriage	laws	in	Chris	and	Pat’s	community.	It	is	precisely	the	dependence	on	constructing	entities	that	is	supposed	to	preclude	dependent	entities	from	being	real.	Consequently,	we	must	specify	what	this	dependence	entails,	and	how	it	bears	on	realism.	To	that	end,	we	must	distinguish	two	central	kinds	of	dependence	that	figure	in	the	constructivist	
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literature	(though	see	Sveinsdóttir	(forthcoming)	for	a	more	nuanced	taxonomy	of	constructions).	First,	there	is	causal	dependence:	
F	causally	depends	on	an	individualistic/social	entity	G	if	and	only	if	F	would	never	have	come	into	existence,	or	would	have	been	substantially	different,	had	G	not	existed.	While	our	chief	concern	is	with	constructed	social	entities,	many	causally	constructed	entities	are	not	social	entities.	For	instance,	some	elements,	such	as	Rutherfordium,	can	only	be	created	in	laboratories,	and	hence	causally	depend	on	scientists’	intention	to	synthesize	such	elements.	However,	elements	are	paradigmatic	examples	of	physical	(non-social)	entities.	More	broadly,	all	artifacts	are	causally	constructed.	For	instance,	a	manufacturer’s	intending	to	produce	a	bicycle	is	a	cause	of	that	bicycle’s	existence.	There	is	widespread	consensus	that	causally	constructed	entities	are	real.	Bicycles	are	causally	dependent	entities,	and	we	have	no	more	reason	to	be	antirealists	about	bicycles	than	Rutherfordium	and	other	natural-scientific	entities.	Thus,	insofar	as	social	entities	are	simply	the	effects	of	people’s	mental	states	and	actions,	then	there	is	no	reason	to	treat	them	as	any	less	real	than	other	artifacts.		 However,	there	is	good	reason	to	think	that	some	social	entities,	such	as	marriage,	are	not	merely	causally	constructed.	This	is	because	marriage	exhibits	a	different	kind	of	dependence:	
F	constitutively	depends	on	individualistic/social	entity	G	if	and	only	if	the	continued	existence	of	G	is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	continued	existence	of	F.	Causally	dependent	entities	can	continue	to	exist	even	after	the	entities	that	constructed	them	have	ceased	to	exist.	By	contrast,	constitutively	dependent	entities	cannot.	To	make	this	vivid,	consider	the	status	of	constructed	entities	if	every	human	were	to	disappear	spontaneously:	bicycles	would	continue	to	exist;	marriages	would	not.		 While	realism	about	causally	constructed	entities	is	generally	accepted,	realism	about	constitutively	constructed	entities	is	more	controversial.	Some	authors	are	realists	about	these	entities	(Haslanger	2012).	Their	argument	proceeds	in	two	steps.	First,	against	those	who	think	that	marriage	is	more	like	cuteness,	they	deny	that	there	is	a	good	inference	from	“x	is	mind-dependent”	to	“x	is	not	real”	(Haslanger	2012;	Rosen	1994).	Second,	they	use	the	Explanatory	Argument	from	above,	but	the	relevant	posits	are	constitutively	dependent	entities.	For	instance,	some	hold	that	race	and	gender	play	prominent	explanatory	roles	in	social	inquiry,	and	hence	are	real,	even	though	they	are	constitutively	dependent	on	certain	social	conditions.	This	would	suggest	the	following	“Constitutive	Variant”	of	the	Explanatory	Argument:	CV1.		 If	the	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	constitutively	dependent	entities,	then	we	should	believe	that	constitutively	dependent	entities	exist.	CV2.	 The	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	constitutively	dependent	entities.	C.	 Therefore,	we	should	believe	that	constitutively	dependent	entities	exist.		
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Realists	of	this	persuasion	might	argue	in	the	following	manner.	Marriage	is	constitutively	dependent.	Moreover,	our	best	explanations	posit	marriage	as	a	central	determinant	of,	e.g.,	psychological	well-being	(Gove,	Hughes,	and	Style	1983).	Consequently,	we	ought	to	believe	that	marriage	exists.		However,	there	are	at	least	three	objections	to	this	argument.	First,	since	constitutively	dependent	entities	are	simply	a	kind	of	social	entity,	the	same	objections	to	the	Explanatory	Argument	apply	to	its	Constitutive	Variant.	Hence,	if	explanatory	pessimism,	fictionalism,	eliminativism,	or	reductionism	is	correct	about	social	entities	in	general,	they	also	apply	to	constitutively	dependent	entities.	Second,	the	Constitutive	Variant	Argument	might	prove	too	much.	For	instance,	it	is	unclear	why	cuteness	is	not	constitutively	dependent	upon	people’s	attitudes	and	emotions.	Moreover,	cuteness	might	well	figure	in	some	of	our	best	explanations,	e.g.	of	the	popularity	of	puppy	memes	on	the	Internet.	However,	as	we	have	already	suggested,	realism	about	cuteness	is	implausible.	While	some	realists	have	bitten	this	bullet	(Haslanger	2012),	others	would	take	this	as	evidence	that	the	first	premise	of	the	argument	(CV1)	is	incorrect.		Third,	it	appears	that	explanations	only	invoking	constitutively	constructing	entities	can	always	“screen	off”	or	“preempt”	any	explanation	of	which	their	corresponding	constitutively	dependent	entity	is	a	part.	As	a	result,	the	second	premise	(CV2)	of	this	argument	can	be	contested.	For	instance,	puppies’	cuteness	is	constitutively	dependent	upon	our	attitudes	about	them.	Consequently,	it	seems	as	if	we	could	just	as	well	explain	the	prevalence	of	Internet	puppy	memes	by	appealing	to	these	attitudes,	rather	than	adding	another	property—cuteness—into	our	ontologies.	Similarly,	although	attitudes	about	race	and	gender	explain	various	social	outcomes,	this	does	not	entail	that	race	and	gender	are	real	or	explanatory.	In	other	words,	to	the	extent	that	an	entity	is	constitutively	constructed,	it	is	unlikely	to	play	the	kind	of	role	in	our	best	explanations	that	licenses	ontological	commitment.		
3.2. Objectivity	Another	way	of	refining	the	Explanatory	Argument	so	that	it	underwrites	realism	about	constitutively	dependent	entities	is	to	identify	further	criteria	that	distinguish	real	constitutive	constructions—such	as	race	and	gender—from	other	kinds	of	constitutively	dependent	entities—such	as	cuteness.	Here,	we	might	(loosely)	follow	John	Searle’s	(1995)	suggestion	that	even	if	the	existence	of	certain	social	entities	depends	on	attitudes	and	social	conditions,	our	judgments	about	those	entities	might	be	no	less	objective	than	our	judgments	about	natural-scientific	entities.		For	instance,	consider	once	again	the	statement	that	Chris	and	Pat	are	married.	Marriages	are	constitutively	dependent	entities:	the	marriage	of	two	people	only	exists	insofar	as	it	is	appropriately	held	to	exist	by	the	legal	structures	of	the	society	in	which	the	participants	live.	Nevertheless,	there	is	a	fact	of	the	matter	about	whether	Chris	and	Pat	are	married,	such	as	the	recognized	laws	about	marriage,	and	whether	the	procedures	required	by	those	laws	were	properly	followed.	More	generally,		
F	is	epistemically	objective	if	and	only	if	it	is	possible	to	hold	that	something	is	an	F	and	be	wrong.	
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Here,	the	“holder”	(i.e.	constructing	entities)	can	either	be	an	individual	or	a	group.	As	should	be	clear,	some	entities,	such	as	vertebrates,	are	epistemically	objective.	It	is	possible	for	somebody	to	be	mistaken	about	who	or	what	is	a	vertebrate.	Moreover,	we	can	also	see	why	some	social	entities	are	epistemically	objective.	For	instance,	suppose	that	Chris	and	Pat	are	a	legally	married	same-sex	couple.	Because	of	his	religious	beliefs,	Frank	may	believe	that	Chris	and	Pat	are	not	married.	However,	Frank’s	religious	beliefs	do	not	nullify	Chris	and	Pat’s	marriage.	Similarly,	at	first	remove,	no	single	individual’s	beliefs	about	race,	gender,	marriage,	employment,	income,	etc.	are	capable	of	nullifying	empirical	statements	about	these	social	entities.		 By	contrast,	judgments	about	cuteness	function	differently	in	our	cognitive	lives.	They	are	epistemically	subjective.	In	particular,	the	truth	of	(nontrivial)	judgments	about	cuteness	depends	on	the	mental	states	of	the	person	judging	something	to	be	cute.	In	other	words:	A	group	or	person’s	holding	that	a	puppy	is	cute	entails	that	the	puppy	is	cute.	The	Searlean	realist	claims	that	cuteness	is	in	the	eye	of	the	beholder,	while	many	claims	about	social	entities	such	as	marriage	are	not.	How	does	this	bear	on	social	constructivism?	While	accounts	of	epistemic	objectivity	claim	that	“holders”	are	either	individuals	or	groups,	social	constructivists	will	typically	favor	an	account	of	epistemic	subjectivity	that	regards	holders	as	social	groups:	
F	is	epistemically	subjective	if	and	only	if	some	group’s	holding	that	something	is	an	F	entails	its	being	an	F.		(Note:	our	discussion	of	epistemic	subjectivity	and	objectivity	is	indebted,	but	not	identical,	to	Searle’s	account.)	As	noted	above,	it	is	implausible	that	an	individual,	such	as	Frank,	can	nullify	a	marriage.	By	contrast,	certain	social	groups	or	their	proxies—such	as	a	legislature	or	a	judge—can	nullify	a	marriage.	Hence,	the	constructivist’s	position	poses	an	interesting	challenge	for	realists	about	constitutively	dependent	entities.	To	summarize,	both	realists	and	constructivists	might	agree	that	some	social	entity	is	constitutively	constructed.	However,	realists	will	claim	that	the	entity	is	epistemically	objective	(and	hence	more	like	Vertebrate),	while	constructivists	will	claim	that	it	is	epistemically	subjective	(and	hence	more	like	Cute).	For	instance,	constructivists	will	claim	that	judgments	about	membership	in	racial	groups	depend	on	some	social	group	making	that	judgment.	How	do	we	adjudicate	between	these	competing	claims?	In	the	context	of	the	social	sciences,	the	defensibility	of	this	kind	of	constructivism	hinges	(in	part)	on	the	specific	methods	that	are	used	to	make	judgments	about	the	social	entity	in	question.	For	instance,	some	interpretive	methodologies	are	sufficiently	reflexive	that	social	scientists’	intuitions,	feelings,	beliefs,	etc.	necessarily	figure	in	their	judgments	about	social	entities	(Bourdieu	and	Wacquant	1992;	Denzin	2001;	Wylie	1994).	Insofar	as	these	methods	are	the	only	or	best	means	of	acquiring	knowledge	about	certain	social	entities,	constructivism	cum	epistemic	subjectivism	is	relatively	straightforward.		By	contrast,	some	methods—particularly	those	that	are	shared	with	the	natural	sciences—purport	to	be	answerable	to	a	set	of	mind-independent	empirical	
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facts.	These	include	observation,	measurement,	statistical	analysis,	and	causal	inference.	If	these	methods	do	what	they	purport	to	do,	then	constructivism	about	the	judgments	that	they	justify	would	appear	misplaced.	However,	some	have	advanced	this	particularly	ambitious	brand	of	constructivism	about	social	entities	(Law	2004),	by	appealing	to	constructivists	about	natural-scientific	entities	who	deny	the	objectivity	of	these	methods	(Bloor	1976;	Kuhn	1996;	Latour	1987;	Latour	and	Woolgar	1986;	Pickering	1984,	1995).	So,	to	summarize,	the	debate	between	constructivists	and	realists	about	social	entities	is	not	a	debate	about	entities	that	are	causally	dependent	on	social	conditions.	Otherwise,	Rutherfordium	would	be	socially	constructed.	Rather,	it	is	a	debate	about	constitutively	constructed	entities.	However,	some	constitutively	constructed	entities,	such	as	cuteness,	do	not	seem	to	warrant	realist	treatment.	So,	when	realists	and	constructivists	disagree	about	constitutively	dependent	entities,	the	real	sticking	point	is	whether	such	entities	are	epistemically	objective	or	epistemically	subjective,	i.e.	whether	the	means	for	making	judgments	about	these	entities	suffices	to	make	those	judgments	true.		 	
4. Conclusion	In	summary,	whether	one	is	discussing	social	groups,	social	constructions,	or	any	other	social	entity,	realists	appeal	first	and	foremost	to	the	Explanatory	Argument.	According	to	this	argument,	if	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities,	then	we	ought	to	believe	that	these	entities	exist.	However,	explanatory	pessimists	cite	science’s	history	of	failed	explanations	as	evidence	against	this	contention.	Fictionalists	also	challenge	this	realist	doctrine	by	claiming	that	we	can	use	social	entities	in	our	best	explanations	without	believing	in	their	existence.		 The	Explanatory	Argument	also	asserts	that	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities.	Paying	special	attention	to	social	groups	reveals	two	challenges	to	this	claim.	First,	eliminativists	claim	that	statements	about	social	groups	are	false,	and	should	be	replaced	by	statements	about	individuals.	Second,	reductionists	claim	that	statements	about	social	groups	are	trivially	true,	because	they	are	really	just	shorthand	for	statements	about	individuals.	In	neither	case	do	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities.		 Yet	another	aspect	of	realism	concerns	the	objectivity	of	social	entities.	As	we	saw,	realists	hold	that	social	entities	are	epistemically	objective,	in	the	sense	that	a	group’s	or	person’s	ideas	about	a	social	entity	could	be	wrong.	Constructivists,	by	contrast,	claim	that	(at	least	some)	social	entities	are	epistemically	subjective,	meaning	that	ideas	about	those	entities	determine	what	they	are.		 A	number	of	options	and	questions	suggest	themselves.	Can	realism	in	the	social	sciences	be	justified	without	the	Explanatory	Argument?	Can	the	challenges	of	eliminativism	and	reductionism	extend	to	social	entities	other	than	groups?	If	social	entities	are	not	real,	why	bother	studying	them?	What	would	social	scientists	lose	by	adopting	one	(or	more)	of	the	antirealist	stances	canvassed	above?	Given	the	variety	of	positions	available,	there	is	ample	room	for	having	nuanced	ontological	positions	in	the	social	sciences.		
Notes	
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